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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
CONTEMPT-Conduct Tending To Defeat the Effect of 
Appeal Pending in Federal Circuit Court Held 
To Be Civil Contempt Even Though Not a 
Resistance to a Formal Court Order-
Griffin v. County School Board* 
Appellants applied for an injunction in a federal district court in 
Virginia to prevent the Prince Edward County Board of Supervisors 
from paying out tuition grants to parents whose children attended 
private segregated schools.1 The district court refused to issue the in-
junction, and the appellants appealed. They asked to have their ap-
peal accelerated, but, since the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Cir-
cuit was not then in session, the Chief Judge requested the Clerk of 
Court to ask the Board of Supervisors to stipulate that no tuition 
grants would be paid pending the appeal. The Board refused to make 
the stipulation. Instead, on the very day that the Chief Judge made 
his request, the Board substantially increased the amount of the tui-
tion grants, and by nine o'clock the next morning it had distributed 
about $180,000 to white parents, most of whom cashed their checks 
at that time. In their appeal, appellants moved for an order that the 
Board show cause why it should not be cited for civil contempt, and 
for an order requiring the Board to restore the money distributed 
after the requested stipulation. The Court of Appeals directed the 
district court to enjoin the Board from paying any tuition grants to 
parents sending children to private segregated schools, but it re-
manded the question of contempt to the district court for further 
findings of fact. 2 The district court found that the payments were 
not violative of any formal court order, and therefore dismissed 
the motion to order the Board to show cause.3 On appeal from this 
dismissal, held, reversed, two judges dissenting. 
• Griffin v. County School Board, 363 F.2d 206 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 960 
(1966) [hereinafter cited as principal case]. 
I. This development occurred during the enforcement of district court decrees re-
quiring the County to reopen its public school system. The County had previously 
voted to close the system rather than to operate it on an integrated basis. For a more 
complete description of this background, see Griffin v. County School Board, 377 U.S. 
218 (1964). 
2. Griffin v. Board of Supervisors, 339 F.2d 486 (4th Cir. 1964). 
3. The district court had, however, enjoined the Board of Supervisors from reim-
bursing parents for tuition expenses incurred during the previous year (1963-1964), and 
the question considered by the district court on remand was whether the challenged 
payments constituted a retroactive payment of tuition grants and, as such, were a viola-
tion of that earlier injunction. Finding no evidence that the money had been paid with 
respect to school years prior to 1964-1965, the district court held that the Board could 
not be adjudged in contempt, apparently regarding its authority to punish for contempt 
as extending only to cases in which a specific court order has been ignored or violated. 
Thus, the district court concluded that the Board was not in contempt despite the fol-
[ 1490] 
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The court rested its decision on two alternative grounds. First, 
making the assumption that the federal contempt statute4 applies to 
civil as well as to criminal contempt, it held that the Board's action, 
which in effect put the subject matter of the litigation beyond the 
reach of the court, was contemptuous because it seriously impaired 
the purpose of the appeal by making possible the continuation of the 
private segregated school system through the very sort of payment 
which was at issue in the case. These payments were considered to 
be an anticipatory resistance to the court's ultimate order or to its 
process as these terms are used in section 401(3) of the contempt 
statute.5 Second, making the assumption that the statute only applies 
to criminal and not to civil contempt, the court alternatively held 
that the Board's action still constituted contempt on the ground that 
it was an unwarranted interference with property in the custody of 
the court. Thus, the Board and its constituent members were ordered 
jointly and severally to restore to the county treasury, through recap-
ture or otherwise, a sum equal to the amount disbursed to the par-
ents, and the case was continued for ninety days from the date of 
decision for a report by the Board of what had been done toward com-
pliance with that order. 
The .first legislation dealing with the contempt power was the 
Judiciary Act of 1789, which gave federal courts the "power ... to 
punish by fine or imprisonment, at the discretion of said courts, all 
contempts of authority in any case or hearing before the same."6 
While this act supposedly codified the common law power of courts 
to punish those in contempt,7 it offered no clear guide as to when 
lowing findings: (1) that after the Board's refusal of the requested stipulation, a petition 
containing 1,004 signatures and requesting the Board to allocate additional funds for 
public education had been submitted to the Board by five Negro citizens; (2) that no 
Board action was taken on this petition; (3) that the members of the Board, the County 
Attorney, and interested citizens combined thereafter to devise and effect a plan to pay 
the challenged tuition grants before the Court of Appeals could enter an order staying 
such payments; (4) that both the County Attorney and the Board's special counsel were 
of the opinion that payment of the tuition grants prior to the appeal would be legal, 
although special counsel advised the Board against taking such action; (5) that a citi-
zens' committee notified the parents of children then attending the private segregated 
schools that if they came to the Board offices that evening and applied for grants, they 
would receive half of the requested amount the next morning; (6) that county bonds 
were sold in Richmond the following morning in order to finance the payment of these 
tuition grant checks; (7) that 1,217 tuition grants were paid, each applicant receiving 
one-half the amount for which he had applied. 
4. A court of the United States shall have the power to punish by fine or imprison-
ment, at its discretion, such contempt of its authority, and none other, as-
(1) Misbehavior of any person in its presence or so near thereto as to obstruct 
the administration of justice; 
(2) Misbehavior of any of its officers in their official transactions; 
(3) Disobediance or resistance to its lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or 
command. 
62 Stat. 701 (1948), 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1964). 
5. Ibid. 
6. 1 Stat. 83 (1789). 
7. In re Savin, 131 U.S. 267, 275-76 (1889). 
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that power might be exercised, and thus courts were left largely to 
their own discretion in applying the statute.8 The courts themselves 
recognized that such an undefined power might prove a source of 
abuse,11 and the impeachment trial of James H. Peck dramatically 
called this possibility to the public's attention. Peck was a federal dis-
trict court judge who had punished an attorney for contempt by im-
prisoning and disbarring him after the attorney had published a 
criticism of one of Peck's opinions while an appeal was pending.10 
Although Peck was acquitted, the case provoked a widespread criti-
cism of the summary contempt power and resulted in the passage of 
an act "declaratory of the law concerning contempts of court."11 This 
act is for all practical purposes still in force today as section 401 of 
the present federal contempt statute. While it is clear that this statute 
restricts the use of criminal contempt proceedings by the lower fed-
eral courts, it is uncertain whether the statute should also be construed 
to limit these courts in their use of civil contempt proceedings.12 
For the purposes of the principal case it made no difference 
whether the statute applied to cases of civil contempt, since the 
majority held the Board in contempt even under the restrictions im-
posed by the statute. To support that holding the majority relied on 
a line of cases, and particularly on two Supreme Court cases, 1'.'1erri-
mack River Savings Bank v. Clay Center13 and Lamb v. Cramer,14 
which have sanctioned the exercise of the contempt power when the 
res involved in a pending proceeding has either been destroyed by 
the defendant or removed by him from the court's jurisdiction, 
thereby rendering nugatory any ultimate decree in the pending pro-
8. Frankfurter & Landis, Power of Congress Over Procedure in Criminal Contempts 
in "Inferior" Federal Courts-A Study in Separation of Powers, 37 HARv. L. REv. 1010, 
1024 (1924). 
9. Ex parte Kearney, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 37, 44 (1822). 
10. A complete record of the impeachment proceedings is contained in STANSBURY, 
REPORT OF THE TRIAL OF JAMES H. PECK (1833). 
11. 4 Stat. 487-88 (1831). 
12. Generally, civil contempt sanctions serve a remedial purpose. The available 
sanctions include the imposition of compensatory fines as well as conditional fines or 
imprisonment, but a defendant can relieve himself of the conditional penalties by 
complying with the court decree. Thus, in the case of civil contempt, it is said that 
a defendant "holds the keys to his prison," see, e.g., Green v. United States, 356 
U.S. 165, 194 (1957), although critics of summary civil contempt dispute this analogy. 
See GOI.DFA.RB, THE CONTEMPT POWER 59-61 (1963). In the case of criminal contempt, 
the sanctions are essentially punitive rather than remedial, and fixed fines or imprison-
ment are commonly used by the court in order to vindicate its authority. For further 
discussion of the difference between civil and criminal contempt, see Gompers v. Bucks 
Stove&: Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 444 (1911); GOLDFARB, op. cit. supra at 49-67; Moskowitz, 
Contempt of Injunctions, Civil and Criminal, 43 CoLUM. L. REv. 780 (1943); Wright, 
Byme, Haakh, Westbrook & Wheat, Civil and Criminal Contempt in the Federal Courts, 
17 F.R.D. 167 (1955); Comment, 57 YALE L.J. 83 (1947). See also notes 39-45 infra and ac-
companying text. 
13. 219 U.S. 527 (1911) 
14. 285 U.S. 217 (1932). 
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ceeding. The majority reasoned that these cases indicate that conduct 
which removes the res from the jurisdiction of the court constitutes 
a violation of the court's "process" under section 401(3).15 
In :Merrimack, a federal district court issued a temporary injunc-
tion, pending a hearing on a bill in equity, to prevent a municipality 
from destroying a utility's poles and wires. The district court subse-
quently dismissed the bill on jurisdictional grounds; however, the 
injunction was continued pending an appeal to the Supreme Court. 
The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal, but before the mandate 
of dismissal had issued, and in the period allowed for making an 
application for a rehearing, the municipality destroyed the poles 
and wires. The Supreme Court declared that this conduct constituted 
a technical contempt: "[a] willfull removal beyond the reach of the 
court of the subject-matter of the litigation [on appeal] . . . is ... 
a contempt of the appellate jurisdiction of this court."16 In the Lamb 
case, the defendant transferred to his lawyer property which was in-
volved in a pending suit to set aside certain conveyances of land and 
dispositions of personal property. Thereafter, the trial court entered 
a decree declaring that the plaintiffs had liens on all the property 
involved in the action, and appointed a receiver to liquidate those 
liens. The Supreme Court held that the property received by the 
attorney was in gremio legis, and that as a result he could be cited 
for civil contempt and thus be forced to restore that property to the 
custody of the court. 
As the dissent in the principal case pointed out,17 there are diffi-
culties with the majority's use of these two cases to support the prop-
osition that the damage resulting from the Board's anticipatory ac-
tion could be remedied under section 401(3) of the contempt statute. 
First, it can be maintained that these tuition grants did not "abort 
the appeal or frustrate the adjudication of the large issue"18 in the 
case; that issue being the constitutionality of a continuing program 
of paying out tuition grants to parents for the purpose of maintain-
ing a private segregated school system. Arguably both Merrimack and 
Lamb are distinguishable from the principal case on this point, since 
in those two cases the ability of the court to adjudicate the large issue 
·was more substantially affected. Nevertheless, in the principal case, 
the majority's view that there was a frustration with regard to the 
large issue is also plausible:19 the distribution of the tuition grants 
might have made possible the future existence of the private segre-
gated school system by providing sufficient funds to tide the system 
over until an alternative mode of financing could be devised. Under 
15. Principal case at 210. 
16. 219 U.S. at 535·36. 
17. Principal case at 213-15. 
18. Id. at 215. 
19. Id. at 2II. 
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this view, these disbursements were comparable in effect to the de-
struction of the utility facilities in Merrimack and to the wrongful 
transfer in Lamb. 
The second possible difficulty with using the Merrimack and 
Lamb cases to support the majority's interpretation of section 401(3) 
is that those two cases may not have been decided under that section 
of the contempt statute. Although section 401 does effectively limit 
and define the contempt powers of the lower federal courts including 
the circuit courts, it is doubtful whether the statute applies to the 
Supreme Court which derives its powers from the Constitution and 
not from Congress.20 In Merrimack the Supreme Court did not refer 
to the statute, but rather spoke as if the conduct of the defendant was 
an affront to its mm jurisdiction;21 thus, the decision appears to rest 
on the ground that the contempt power of the Supreme Court is not 
restricted by the statute. If the case was decided on that basis, it 
would have no relevance to the principal case. It is also likely that 
the Lamb decision was based on the Supreme Court's inherent power 
to punish for contempt, since once again the statute was not men-
tioned in the opinion. However, even assuming that the Supreme 
Court was not acting in its own right but was instead asserting the 
authority of a lower court to exercise contempt powers in a way that 
is compatible with the restrictions of the statute, it is arguable that 
the decision was reached under section 401 (2) of the statute rather 
than under section 401(3).22 Prior to the Lamb decision, the Supreme 
Court had indicated in dictum that it would treat an attorney as an 
"officer" of the court within the meaning of section 401(2);23 thus, if 
the court in Lamb was operating, sub silentio, within the confines of 
the contempt statute, it could have founded its decision on the 
20. Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 505, 510 (1873). 
21. Mr. Justice Burton, writing for the court said: 
It does not necessarily follow that disobedience of such an injunction, intended only 
to preserve the status quo pending on appeal, may not be regarded as a contempt 
to the appellate jurisdiction of this court, which might be rendered nugatory by 
conduct calculated to remove the subject-matter of the appeal beyond its control, 
or by its destruction. This we need not decide, since irrespective of any such in-
junction actually issued, the willful removal beyond the reach of the court of the 
subject matter of the litigation, or its destruction pending an appeal from a decree 
praying ..• an injunction to prevent such removal or destruction until the right 
shall be determined, is, in and of itself, a contempt of the appellate jurisdiction of 
this court. 
219 U.S. at 535-36. 
22. See note 4 supra. 
23. We do not doubt the power of the court to punish attorneys as officers of the 
same, for misbehavior in the practice of the profession. • • . This is recognized in 
the act of 1831 ..• which, after providing for personal contempt in the presence 
of the court, authorizes attachments to issue, and summary punishment to be in-
flicted, for "the misbehavior of the officers of said courts in their official transac-
tions." 
Ex parte Bradley, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 364, 374 (1868). Lower court decisions which adopted 
this view that an attorney is an officer of the court for purposes of contempt are Tanner 
v. United States, 62 F.2d 601 (10th Cir. 1932), and Ex parte Davis, 112 Fed. 139, 142 
(C.C. Fla. 1901). 
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ground that the attorney was subject to the court's statutory contempt 
power because he was an "officer" of the court who engaged in con-
duct that tended to nullify any decrees the court might ultimately 
make.24 Neither Lamb nor Merrimack, therefore, provides substan-
tial support for the majority's position that the language of section 
401(3) has been extended to encompass action taken in anticipation 
of a court's decree. 
Even if it is assumed, arguendo, that Lamb and Merrimack were 
decided under the provisions of section 401(3), it is still possible to 
distinguish those cases factually from the situation in the principal 
case. The Second Circuit, in Berry v. Midtown Service Corp.,25 held 
that it could not cite a corporate judgment creditor for contempt, 
even though that creditor had, after obtaining a stay of execution 
without giving a bond, made itself execution proof by conveying sub-
stantially all of its assets to affiliated corporations. The court in Berry 
interpreted the Lamb and Merrimack decisions as not standing for 
the broad proposition that the contempt powers may be used to pre-
vent anticipatory resistance to judicial decrees, but rather as creating 
a narrow exception to the statutory restriction of the use of contempt 
powers to apply only in situations in which specific or unique prop-
erty is either removed from the jurisdiction of the court or destroyed 
with an intent to subvert the effect of pending litigation.26 Thus, the 
exception did not apply to the Berry fact situation, since the assets 
that were conveyed to avoid execution had not been the specific sub-
jects of the litigation-the suit itself only being concerned with gen-
eral personal Iiability.27 Once it had disposed of Merrimack and 
Lamb, the Second Circuit then rejected the argument that the judg-
ment debtor could be held for contempt under section 401(3), on the 
ground that with the exception of one district court case,28 precedent 
24. Recently, however, the Supreme Court has held that the term "officer" in§ 401(2) 
does not encompass attorneys. The Court's rationale seems to be that the summary 
power to punish criminal contempt ought to be minimized. Cammer v. United States, 
350 U.S. 399 (1956). 
25. 104 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1939). 
26. Id. at 109-10. 
27. Ibid. 
28. Lineker v. Dillon, 275 Fed. 460 (N.D. Cal. 1921). On facts similar to Berry, the 
court held that when a judgment debtor, who had obtained a stay of execution, re-
moved property beyond the reach of the court's process in order to nullify the effect of 
the adverse judgment, he rendered himself as guilty of violating its order as if the stay 
order had in positive terms required that his assets be maintained at the same value as 
at the date of judgment. Thus, although there was no outstanding order, the district 
court was not of the opinion that the language of the statute precluded using civil con-
tempt as a means of forcing the defendants to indemnify the judgment creditor when 
an order could reasonably be inferred from the circumstances. Apart from the fact that 
this is a district court opinion, the strength of the decision as authority is questionable 
on another count. The Lineker court relied on a statement in Toledo Newspaper Co. v. 
United States, 247 U.S. 402, 418 (1918), that the federal contempt statute "conferred 
no power not already granted and imposed no limitations not already existing"-
a statement, the accuracy of which, has been disproved. See Frankfurter &: Landis, supra 
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established that a party must have violated an express court order 
before he can be cited for contempt under that provision. Arguably 
the principal case presents essentially the same fact pattern as was 
found in Berry. The majority in the principal case, however, ruled 
that Berry presented no obstacle to their decision; they reasoned that 
the principal case involved conduct fitting within the narrow con-
fines of the Lamb and Merrimack exception as interpreted by Berry, 
since "the suit and appeal were directed to a specific subject, the 
Board's right to apply to a certain purpose moneys within its 
power."29 Furthermore, the majority apparently went beyond the 
Berry court's narrow reading of Lamb and Merrimack and instead 
interpreted those cases as authorizing so broad a reading of the word 
"process" in section 401(3) that any resistance taken in anticipation 
of a decree is brought within the statutory contempt power.30 
The majority did not devote significant discussion to its alterna-
tive holding which is founded on the assumption that the restrictions 
imposed by the federal contempt statute do not apply to civil con-
tempt situations such as the principal case.31 The scope of section 401 
note 8, at 1029-38. Furthermore, the Toledo case was expressly overruled in Nye v. 
United States, 313 U.S. 33, 52 (1941). 
The Berry result has been preferred to the Lineker holding for several reasons. First, 
the Lineker doctrine, allowing contempt in the absence of a formal court order, would 
be hard to limit. Secondly, contempt proceedings would deprive defendants of proce-
dural protections to which they would otherwise be entitled. Finally, this broad inter-
pretation of the statutory contempt power was unnecessary because a fraudulent con-
veyance action was available to the judgment creditor. See 49 YALE L.J. 580 (1940). 
29. Principal case at 211. 
30. See principal case at 211 where the majority states that the statute does not limit 
contempt to extant decrees, and that an appeal which is "alive" at the time of resistance 
constitutes a "process" within the meaning of the statute. The dissent, however, main-
tains that "process" in the context of the statute "can reasonably be understood to mean 
no more than the sum of more explicit terms, such as 'original process' ••• all of which 
clearly refer to papers issuing from the court and embodying its command or judgments, 
or notice of them. Construed so expansively as the majority's suggestion ••• it would 
entirely contravene the clearly limiting purpose of the congressional act." Id. at 213. 
The majority failed to mention a decision of their own circuit, predating both Lamb 
and Merrimack, which seems ,to dictate a result contrary to that reached in the principal 
case. In Ex parte Buskirk, 72 Fed. 14 (4th Cir. 1896), plaintiff alleged that defendant in 
a pending action of ejectment was disobeying a stipulation that had been made in open 
court by removing timber from the land in question. The Fourth Circuit held that there 
was no statutory jurisdiction for contempt proceedings, since the defendant had not 
been formally ordered to refrain from removing the timber prior to the time he was 
proceeded against for contempt. It is not clear whether the principal case impliedly 
overruled the apparent holding of Buskirk that there is no extra-statutory basis for a 
lower court contempt conviction. The case could be reconciled on the theory that the 
principal case adhered to the Berry interpretation of the Lamb and Merrimack cases: 
disbursement of the tuition grants could be considered a question of unique importance 
in determining the future of the county's schools, whereas the removal of the timber 
could be deemed a less irreparable kind of harm for which financial compensation at 
a later date might fully satisfy the injured party. It is doubtful, however, that the 
principal case limited itself to the Berry interpretation. 
31. Principal case at 211. The majority suggests that the failure of the court in 
Lamb to mention the statute should not affect the result in the principal case. The 
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is unclear. In enacting the predecessor to section 401 after the Peck 
trial in 1831, the House unanimously resolved "that the Committee 
on the Judiciary be directed to inquire into the expediency of defin-
ing, by statute, all offenses which may be punished as contempts of 
the courts of the United States, and also to limit the punishment of 
the same.''32 This inquiry resulted in a bill "declaratory of the law 
concerning contempts of court," which later became the Act of 
1831.33 The broad language of the direction to the Committee on the 
Judiciary and the title of the bill suggest that the Congress intended 
no distinction between civil and criminal contempt, and that the bill 
was passed to restrict judicial power in both cases. Such a conclusion 
is bolstered by the fact that in 1831 the public had a great mistrust 
for all applications of the summary contempt power. 
On the other hand, it is possible to marshal several arguments in 
support of the proposition that section 401 applies only to cases of 
criminal contempt. Historically, the contempt statute was enacted 
against the background of public furor resulting from the alleged 
abuse of the criminal contempt power in the Peck trial. In addition, 
the language of the present statute speaks in terms of limiting "the 
power to punish by fine or imprisonment.''34 This language of pun-
ishment sounds as if it were designed to refer to criminal contempt 
and not to civil contempt, which normally is imposed for remedial 
purposes. Furthermore, since courts are sometimes said to have an 
inherent power to remove obstructions to the discharge of their 
duties,35 and since the Judiciary Act of 1789 recognized a broad 
judicial power to punish for contempt,36 it can be contended strongly 
that any subsequent statutory limitation of the power should be ex-
plicit. 
From the standpoint of precedent, judicial confusion as to the 
scope of the statute is evident: some courts have assumed that section 
401 applies in the context of civil as well as criminal contempt pro-
ceedings;37 other courts have implicitly assumed that the statute does 
majority reasons that if the Lamb decision was not impliedly based on the majority's 
statutory interpretation, then it must have rested on the theory that the statute applies 
only to criminal contempt and, therefore, has no relevance to a court's power to use 
civil contempt in order to recover a res involved in pending litigation from a defendant 
who has interfered with the constructive possession of the court. 
32. 7 CoNG. DEB. 560-61 (1831) [1830-1831]. (Emphasis added.) See notes 10-12 supra 
and accompanying text. 
33. H.R. JoUR. 382 (1831). 
34. See note 4 supra. 
35. Bessette v. W. B. Conkey Co., 194 U.S. 324 (1904); Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. 
(19 Wall.) 505, 510 (1873). The inherent character of the contempt power is discussed 
by Frankfurter 8c Landis, supra note 8, at 1016-24. 
36. See note 6-10 supra. 
37. In Raymor Ballroom Co. v. Buck, 110 F.2d 207 (1st Cir. 1940), the First Circuit 
assumed that the statute applied to a proceeding for civil contempt and ordered a 
judgment debtor, who had interfered with levy of execution in the sum of about $600, 
committed to jail until he paid a fine of $600 to indemnify his judgment creditor or 
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not apply in the civil contempt situation38-this may in fact explain 
why there is no reference to the statute in either Merrimack or Lamb. 
It has been suggested that in terms of policy there is no reason why 
section 401 should not be equally applicable to all contempts,30 and 
that the ambiguity of the statute should be resolved by holding that 
the statute does control civil contempt. Arguably, however, it may 
not be as necessary to restrict the courts in their use of the contempt 
powers in civil contempt cases as it is in criminal contempt cases. 
In the classic civil contempt proceeding, the court does not bring the 
action to vindicate its own honor, but rather to impose conditional 
penalties which aid the other parties in the case,40 although an ele-
ment of enhancing the respect of the court may still remain. Con-
versely, criminal contempt involves fixed penalties primarily de-
signed to vindicate disrespect for the judicial process, although a 
civil element may also be present, such as extracting the cooperation 
of a recalcitrant witness.41 Thus, it can be argued that there is less 
objection to the use of summary procedure in the civil contempt con-
text than in the case of criminal contempt: dispensing with an indict-
ment and a jury trial seems more justifiable in civil cases, not only 
because of the conditional nature of the penalty imposed, but also 
because of the interest of the injured party in having a prompt reso-
lution of the contempt question and the defendant's lack of a sub-
stantial interest in having a full-fledged hearing on that question.42 
Nevertheless, there are policy reasons for broadly interpreting the 
until further order of the court. In Penfield Co. v. SEC, 330 U.S. 585, 594 (1947), the 
Supreme Court assumed, arguendo, that the statute governed civil as well as criminal 
contempt proceedings. Certainly the opinions in Lineker and Buskirk, see notes 27 &: 
29 supra, involve an implicit assumption that a defendant may not be cited for civil 
contempt except within the limitations of the statute. But see In re Sixth &: Wis. 
Tower, 108 F.2d 538, 542-46 (7th Cir. 1939), where Justice Evans, concurring in part, 
argues that the statute does not restrict the power of a court sitting in equity to control 
the conduct of litigants in pending proceedings or to protect property within its 
custody. He maintains that the civil contempt power is an inherent power of equity 
courts, and ,that abridgement of this power would be inconsistent with Congress' grant 
of equitable jurisdiction. 
38. The Eighth Circuit in Clay v. Waters, 178 Fed. 385 (8th Cir. 1910), did not 
refer to the statute when it held that an adjudication in bankruptcy operates as a 
transfer to the court of all the property in the possession of the bankrupt at the time 
of the adjudication in which he has any interest; that thereafter such property is to be 
considered part of a trust estate in the legal custody of the court for the benefit of the 
creditors of the bankrupt; and that if the bankrupt disposes of that property for the 
purpose of withdrawing it from the jurisdiction of the court, he can be held subject 
to civil contempt proceedings. The Second Circuit, however, would apparently apply 
the statute under these circumstances, for it has held that since the bankrupt has 
violated no specific court order, the court of bankruptcy has no contempt jurisdiction. 
In re Probst, 205 Fed. 512 (2d Cir. 1913). 
39. Wright, Byrne, Haakh, Westbrook & Wheat, supra note 12, at 169-70. 
40. The most recent Supreme Court statement on the character of civil contempt is 
found in Shillitani v. United States, 382 U.S. 913 (1966). 
41. See GOLDFARB, op. cit. supra note 12, at 57-58. 
42. This civil/criminal distinction is drawn in 73 HARv. L. REv. 353 (1959). 
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statute so as to limit the courts' use of both criminal and civil con-
tempt powers. Some commentators feel that the inherent differences 
between civil and criminal contempt are so attenuated that treating 
the two kinds of defendants differently is unjustified.43 It cannot be 
ignored that civil contempt does seem more like a criminal proceed-
ing than does ordinary civil litigation, since the defendant may be 
subject to a fine or to imprisonment if he does not comply with the 
order, and since to some extent a finding of civil contempt attaches 
a criminal stigma to the defendant. 
The Supreme Court has apparently adopted the view that sum-
mary procedures are less obnoxious in the civil contempt setting. It 
has recently held that criminal contempt sentences of more than six 
months may not be imposed by federal courts unless the defendant 
has had a jury trial or has waived his right to such a trial;44 however, 
at the same time it has also ruled that civil contempt proceedings can 
be conducted absent the safeguards of indictment and jury, provided 
that the usual due process requirements are met.45 Certainly the same 
distinction might be made in determining the scope of section 401. 
If criminal contempt defendants are given procedural safeguards not 
conferred upon civil contempt defendants, consistency might suggest 
that the protection that section 401 affords should apply only to 
criminal contempt. 
Despite the disagreement as to the propriety of treating civil and 
criminal contempt differently, the above discussion does at least sug-
gest that there is some basis in policy and precedent for the court's 
alternative holding that the civil contempt power is not subject to 
the same statutory limitations as is the criminal contempt power. 
However, it appears from the scheme of the opinion in the principal 
case that the court intended to emphasize its holding of contempt 
under section 40 l (3). It would have been preferable for the court to 
reach its decision exclusively on the basis of the alternative holding, 
for the language that the court used in upholding its decision within 
the framework of section 401(3) would seem to leave the door open 
for a similar expansion in the reach of the criminal contempt power. 
There is no indication that the court's broad interpretation of the 
section's terminology-namely, "resistance to its lawful writ, process, 
order, rule, decree, or command"-should apply to anticipatory re-
sistance in the civil context and not in the criminal context. Clearly, 
such an extension of the sweep of criminal contempt would be incon-
sistent with the Supreme Court's general policy of construing crimi-
nal contempt powers strictly.46 Despite the language of the opinion, 
43. See GOLDFARB, op. cit. supra note 12, at 49-67; Nelles, The Summary Power To 
Punish for Contempt, 31 CoLUM. L. REv. 956, 961 (1931). 
44. Chelf v. Schnackenberg, 382 U.S. 917 (1966). 
45. Shillitani v. United States, 382 U.S. 913 (1966). 
46. In Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33 (1941), the Supreme Court held that the 
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however, it should be remembered that the facts of the principal case 
and of the other cases on which the court relied in making its decision 
within section 401(3), do suggest a possible interpretation which 
would in large measure eliminate the objection that the decision has 
widely broadened the sweep of both civil and criminal contempt.41 
It may be that the word "process" should be given a broad reading 
only when contempt is used to protect the jurisdiction of the court 
over specific or unique property, as was suggested in the Berry case. 
Viewed from this perspective, the principal case could be said to open 
the possibility of statutory contempt for anticipatory resistance to 
decrees in only a narrowly limited class of cases. 
It is submitted, however, that on balance history and policy sug-
gest that the court should have denied that it possessed jurisdiction 
to cite the defendants for contempt at all. The following considera-
tions all support the contention that the statute applies to civil as 
well as criminal contempt: the broad language of the House resolu-
tion, and of the bill which gave rise to the statute;48 the general dis-
favor of summary judicial power both when the original statute was 
passed and among some contemporaneous commentators;49 the inevi-
table criminal overtones which accompany a civil contempt citation 
with its possible sanction of conditional imprisonment; the number 
of decisions which have assumed that the statute does apply to civil 
contempt;50 and the general proposition that jurisdictional statutes 
should be strictly construed. Moreover, it is unquestionable that the 
statute was designed to limit severely those uses of the contempt 
power to which it applies. Thus, the statute should have been inter-
preted to prohibit the use of contempt in the principal case, since no 
substantial authority prior to the case has held unequivocally that an 
anticipatory resistance to process should be considered a violation of 
the statute. 
It should be observed that such a decision would not necessarily 
leave the appellants in the principal case without a remedy against 
the clearly wrongful action of the Board. A taxpayer is not helpless 
when municipal or county officials improperly disburse public 
language "in its [the court's] presence or so near thereto as to obstruct the administra-
tion of justice" which appears in § 401(1) should be strictly construed so as to require 
geographical proximity to the court. Prior to this decision, the language had been more 
broadly interpreted to include almost any conduct obstructing the administration of 
justice. See Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247 U.S. 402 (1918). Similarly, in 
Cammer v. United States, 350 U.S. 399 (1956), the court narrowly construed the term 
"officer" of the court in § 401(2) so as to exclude attorneys, although attorneys had 
theretofore been held to fall within the scope of the statute. See note 22 supra. 
47. See text accompanying notes 13-16 supra. 
48. See notes 32·33 supra. 
49. See note 43 supra. 
50. See note 37 supra. 
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funds.151 In Virginia, it has been held, in Johnson v. Black,52 that a 
court of equity could compel a Board of Supervisors to restore county 
funds which the Board had improperly appropriated to its own use, 
in addition to enjoining the Board from further depletion of the 
county treasury. In other jurisdictions, recovery of improper dis-
bursements has been upheld on the theory that the taxpayers are the 
equitable owners of the diverted public funds, and that therefore the 
officers responsible for such disbursements have breached a fiduciary 
duty owed to the taxpayers.53 Knowing recipients of the wrongful 
payments may be liable under this latter theory along with the public 
officers.154 Therefore, since the parents who accepted the tuition 
grants in the principal case would seem to have had notice from the 
unusual manner of distribution that the propriety of the payments 
was questionable, recovery from them, as well as from the Board, 
would appear possible under this public trust theory. 
The Fourth Circuit, perhaps, took into account the possibility 
that some jurisdictions would not allow such relief. Furthermore, the 
court may have reasoned that obtaining restitution from the parents 
would prove particularly difficult, since many had probably already 
spent the money in reliance upon the legality of the grant, and that 
therefore the treasury would more likely be replenished if it forced 
the Board to make a dramatic appeal for the return of the money 
based on the plea that its members were going to go to jail unless the 
money was raised. That the resolution of this case may be best ex-
plained by such reasoning demonstrates that judicial contempt, which 
has always been a suspect procedure, has not remained as precisely 
limited and defined as the Congress of 1831 intended. The case sug-
51. See, e.g., Mines v. Del Valle, 201 Cal. 273, 257 Pac. 530 (1927). 
52. 103 Va. 477, 49 S.E. 633 (1905). Complainants were taxpayers who discovered 
that the County Board of Supervisors had for eleven years been violating the law with 
respect to the compensation of its members. The court held that it had jurisdiction 
not only to enjoin future payments, but also to compel the restitution of funds 
distributed to recipients having notice of the illegality of the distribution. The case 
is discussed in Hill, Tort and Contracts Claims Against Counties, 7 WM. &: MARY L. 
REv. 61 (1966). 
53. E.g., Golden v. City of Flora, 408 III. 129, 96 N.E.2d 506 (1951). 
54. It is said that when a .third party participates in a breach of trust by receiving 
trust property with knowledge of the breach, he is equally liable with the fiduciary. 
The theory is that the third party commits a wrong against the beneficiary rather than 
against the trustee, and an action may be brought against him in equity by the 
beneficiary, even though the fiduciary may also have a right to recover against him. 
Hammond, Fiduciary Liability for Erroneous Distributions, in CURRENT TRENDS IN 
STATE LEGISLATION 1955-56, 139, 142 (1957). See also Jackson v. Norris, 72 III. 364 (1874), 
a case not unlike the principal case, and 3 Scorr, TRUSTS § 294.1 (2d ed. 1956). In 
Jackson, the authorities of a municipal corporation misappropriated funds of the 
municipality in order to pay debts which a private corporation owed to a bank-the 
bank collusively receiving the misappropriated funds. The court, relying on a breach 
of public trust theory, ruled that the taxpayers were entitled to equitable relief, 
holding the bank as well as the municipal officers responsible for the amount mis-
appropriated. 
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gests at least that the language of the statute should be redrafted to 
make clear whether section 401(3) should be interpreted to include 
anticipatory resistance to ultimate decrees and whether the statute 
should be construed to apply to civil as well as criminal contempt. 
